Abstract-In the present paper, the problem of attacks on cyber-physical systems via networked control system (NCS) subject to unmeasured disturbances is considered. The geometric approach is used to evaluate the security and vulnerability level of the controlled system. The presented work deals with the so-called false data injection attacks and shows how imperfectly known disturbances can be used to perform undetectable, or at least stealthy, attacks that can make the NCS vulnerable to attacks from malicious outsiders. A numerical example is given to illustrate the approach.
are regularly reported for instance in [21] . Recently, Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek managed to take the control of a car through wireless communication [9] . In fact, the unauthorized access ("cyber attack") or information handling and disturbances as a deliberate planned action is now also possible in control systems and have only been recently recognized as a major research area [4] , [16] , [22] . Therefore, the design of secure NCS is of utmost importance.
Research in security of NCS can be roughly classified into two approaches with different perspectives challenges. The first approach is mainly inspired by research in computer science and considers the protection of information in the network (or "cyber") part of a NCS using methods coming from "conventional" IT information-security. However, the special properties of control systems from an IT perspective are taken into account: special (sometimes embedded) hardware, special software (like programming languages for logic controllers), real-time requirements, no frequent patching and updates of software etc. The basic security measures for control systems inspired by conventional IT systems are mechanisms for prevention of intrusion like authentication, access control and cryptographic mechanisms to guarantee data integrity and confidentiality, but attackers can still affect the system noninvasively via the physical environment [13] . Some examples of this approach are given by the application of hash functions [14] , of coded sensors [8] or authentication procedure [12] .
The comparatively new second approach, inspired by control engineering methods, focuses on investigating how cyber-attacks compromise the control algorithms with a resulting impact on the physical part and how control engineering methods can be applied to contribute to the security of NCS. Indeed, it became necessary to address the security chalenge related to the attacks against the control system, where the attacker can take over a sensor and supply wrong or delayed measures, or even disturb actuation [13] . Research in this area covers mathematical modeling of cyber-attacks and their impact on the physical process under control, detection of cyber-attacks based on dynamic models of the physical process as well as the control algorithm. Regarding possible models of cyber-attacks on NCS, mainly denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and false data injection attacks (e.g. as invariant zero attacks or replay attacks, exponential or permanent) are considered, targeting sensors or actuators or both [22] . In [20] for example, the author highlighted the danger of total cyber attacks (on all control inputs and all output measurement) on disturbed system thanks to a frequency domain approach. In [19] , the maximal robustly controlled invariant set is defined as a secure set with possible presence of disturbance. It is important to note that most contributions on cyber attacks on NCS consider only the nominal system, even though good performance can be ensured despises actuator/sensor noises, disturbance, unknown inputs, neglected nonlinearity, neglected modes, uncertainties and varying parameters (see [10] , [22] , [11] and [2] for more details).
Different tools were investigated and used to study such attacks, as for instance graph theory (see [15] ). Proposed detectors are inspired by classical fault detection and isolation on control systems and are mainly using a model-based approach. It compares the process output estimation to the available measurements. This is done by using observers. Any difference between the measured process variables and the obtained estimates from the attack-free model is called a residual, analysis of residual can yield to the attack detection.
B. Paper contribution
In the following contribution, a focus is given to cybersecurity of CNS. The aim of this article is to propose a study based on the attack resilience and vulnerability of the disturbed systems. Based on the geometrical approach, the problem of "fake disturbance attack" is considered where the hacker can take over a sensor via the unknown disturbance signal, which will make the attack difficult to detect. The worst case scenario of data transmission interception is also considered, which enables the hacker to identify more accurately the system and helps him to launch stealthy or undetectable attacks. The obtained results are illustrated through a case study of a one-dimensional moving cart example.
Based on invariant zeros analysis, the security level of a system can be evaluated. Indeed, avoiding invariant zeros with a null real part seems to be a first step in the protection against data injection attack via fake disturbance.
The proposed results are based on the one presented in [5] . Indeed, in both contributions, the geometrical approach is used to solve the problem of the fake disturbance attack. However, in the present one, the results are extended by the intrusion/attack risk and security level evaluation with the study of the conditions for these disturbances to remain undetectable (section III.C). A short study regarding the invariant zero danger with analysis of different cases is also added in section (section III.D). Simulations results and figures were also added to complete the study.
The paper is organized as follows. First in section II, the problem formulations for attacked systems and fake disturbance attack are given. The cyber-safety of our system is analyzed with regards to its output and the considered problem is adapted in order to be treated as a classical input attack. In section III, the proposed model will be used to evaluate the security level of our system against malicious attacks. Two kinds of stealthy attack are described. Then, in the third part (C), the attack is also analyzed and conditions to remain undetectable are stated with some risk and security level evaluation. A simple and illustrative example is presented in section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
Remark 1: In the sequel of the paper, the following notations will be used: X † denotes the pseudo-inverse of the matrix X satisfying
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the following section, important definitions, fundamental lemmas of the geometric approach, as well as the problem statement are given.
For a given linear system of the form:
where x(t) ∈ R n is the state vector, u(t)∈ R m the controlled input and y(t) ∈ R p the output. ImB and Ker C are denoted respectively B =ImB and C =Ker C. In the present paper, and from a cyber-attack perspective, even if there exists different categories of zeros, only invariant zeros are considered here. In fact, as it will be detailed in the next sections, the existence of invariant zeros will ensures the existence of undetectable attacks.
A. Attacked system
In order to avoid detection from attack/fault sensors, one way for a hacker to launch his attack on a physical process may be to "hide" it by using an unknown (or imperfectly known) disturbance. In the sequel of the paper, this kind of attack is refereed as "fake disturbance attack". Conditions for "fake disturbance attack" detection will be given in section B. Let us consider a real linear system described by the following model:
where x r (t) ∈ R n is the state vector, u r (t) ∈ R m the control input, y r (t) ∈ R p the measured output and w r (t) ∈ W the unknown disturbance of dimension q that can represent uncertainties, modeling errors or unknown inputs. a(t) ∈ R s represents a cyber attack and D is defined as a selecting matrix (i.e. if D = 0, there is no attack). System (2) controlled by an output feedback u r = −Ky r becomes:
Based on the definition given by Pasqualetti and al. in [16] , and derived from the deterministic case (B w = 0), the following monitor definition as well as the detection condition lemma are given:
Definition 1: A monitor is a deterministic algorithm with access to continuous-time measurements and knowledge of the system dynamics. In other words, for system (2), the monitor input is defined by Λ = {A, B u , C, B w , K, y r (t), t ≥ 0} and its output by Φ(Λ). The output Φ(Λ) reveals the presence of attacks and may takes two values: "True" or "False" (the attack a(t) is detected by the monitor if Φ(Λ) =True for example).
Lemma 1: Consider system (2) disturbed by w r (t), with x 0 r initial condition and a monitor Φ(A, B u , C, B w , y r (t), t 0), the non zero attack a(t) is not detectable if and only if ∃ w f (t) ∈ W and an initial
The proof of this lemma can be obtained in a straightforward way as the lemma 3.1 proof in [16] .
B. Fake disturbance attack
As explained in the previous subsection, lemma 1 gives the condition for a possible "fake disturbance attack". To achieve that purpose, the attacker is supposed to have a full knowledge of the system and of its control, so he can simulate the following "false" system:
r as initial state. The cyber-safety of our system is analyzed w.r.t its output. In this case, the respective outputs of systems (3) and (4) are decomposed into two parts; a p h hacked/hackable/networked outputs noted y ih (t) = C h x i (t) and a p u unhacked/unhackable/wired/secured outputs noted y iu (t) = C u x i (t) for i ∈ {r, f }. According to this decomposition, the matrices C and D are partitioned as follows:
to rewrite the output y r (t) as:
Taking into account the data injection attack where the measurements of system (3) are partially replaced by data from the simulated model (4), i.e. Da(t) = C h x f (t) − C h x r (t), the following dynamic system is obtained:
where
f . From the obtained model (6), a parallel can be made with the system equation (1); the presented results on the geometrical approach can be applied considering the "fake disturbance attack" u(t) as an input (i.e. u(t) from (1)), controlled by the hacker, and used to create a gap between the stable and the attacked states. In the following, the proposed model will be used to evaluate the security level of the system.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In the following section, several results on different kind of attacks are presented. Conditions for the attacks to remain undetectable are stated with some risk and security level evaluation.
A. Malicious Attacks
In this subsection, it will be shown (in theorem 1) that the malicious attacks may have a more various presentation. For instance, if in the presence of missing measurement, the controlled invariant subspace F is unobservable, we can have an attack of the form u(t) = B W v(t) with v(t) arbitrary and considered as a malicious attack. Malicious attacks can be defined based on Basile and Marro work [3] , (chapter 4, theorem 4.1.4 or 4.1.6), or Theorem 5.1 of Pasqualetti et al. [15] .
Theorem 1: u(t) is an output nulling input for system (1) (malicious attack) if and only if for the state feedback u(t) = F x(t)+B F v(t), where B F is a matrix of full column rank such that Im(BB F ) ⊆ F, there exists an (A + BF )-controlled invariant F ⊆ V * .
• Proof: (if) As F ⊆ V * , a similar proof that the one given in [15] is straightforwardly obtained by defining a nonsingular transformation matrix P = P 1 P 2 P 3 with Im(P 1 ) = R * , Im([P 1 P 2 ]) = V * and P 3 chosen such that P is invertible. With a control input/attack u(t) = F P x (t)+u (t) (F is such that V * (A + BF )-invariant), in the new P −1 x coordinates, the system matrices (1) become:
In (7), the obtained two first subspaces are unobservable where the second one is the one linked with invariant zero (s.t. A 22 is a square matrix of dimension q (see [1] for more details)). The first subspace is controllable. However, in order to be part of the state that can be freely driven we must have
T and B 11 = P −1 B V * , such that B V * is of full column rank matrix and R is of full row rank matrix (B V * and R are of dimensions m × ν V * and ν V * × n respectively). This statement comes from applying the following lemma given by Piziak [17] :
Lemma 2: Let Γ and Λ be complex m 2 ×m 1 and m 2 ×m 3 matrices, respectively, with m 1 < m 2 , m 3 < m 2 . Then:
Im(Γ) ∩ Im(Λ) Which leads for a basis V of V * , for all v ∈ R ν V * , B V * v is the controlled part of an output nulling control input as BB V * v ⊆ B ∩ V * such that:
(only if) u is an output nulling input, ∃ x 0 such that y(x 0 , u, t) = 0. We note F = {x(x 0 , u, t), t > 0} and F = span(F) and also note U = {u(t), t > 0} and U = span(U). B U is the basis of U and thus ∃ λ a function of t from R + to
Considering the following lemma [3] Lemma 3: Any state trajectory x |[t0,t1] of (1) belongs to a subspace L ⊆ R n if and only if
B. Stealthy Attacks
In this subsection, stealthy attacks are considered. In the following, the goal of a hacker may be to find an attack that maximizes its effects on the system states. Considering the input u(t) as a potential attack on system (1), we first recall the definition of bounded permanent attacks:
Definition 2: A system is permanently boundly attackable if and only if ∀ T ∈ R + * , ∀ α ∈ R + * , it exists a bounded signal u(t) and a positive real T 1 such that ∀ t > T 1 , ||x|| 2, [t,t+T ] α. u is called a bounded permanent attack.
Remark 2: The permanent bounded attack u(t) reaches an effect : ||x|| 2 > α at least periodically, but for a chosen period. Two kinds of attacks will be considered. Permanent (or step function) attacks and crenel (periodic discontinuous) attacks.
1) Permanent (step function) Attacks: In the following, are given the condition for a malicious stealthy attack to remain undetectable. The attack is called "permanent" and is represented by a step function signal. Considering a malicious attack that consists of the part F x(t) (see Th.1), the attacker needs either a full knowledge of the state, by using for example a functional observer of the form F x(t), or he can performs his attack based on the invariant zero (s 0 ). In the second approach, the control input (state feedback) can be built with no knowledge on the state thanks to the structural knowledge of the system. In fact, knowing the invariant zero s 0 , the attacker could search for the null space K of
T , where x 0 is the state-zero direction and u 0 is the input-zero direction. The pair (A, B) has to be controllable and (A, C) observable. Then, the input u(t) = λu 0 Re(e s0t ) could be settled, then:
Where x f (t) = e At x(0) is the attack-free system behavior, x u (t) = e At λx 0 + t 0 e A(t−τ ) Bu(τ )dτ is the zero based attack behavior, x u (t) = e s0t x 0 with Cx 0 = 0 and Cx u (t) = 0. The residual due to the mismatch between the attack and initial condition is −Ce
At λx 0 . If we consider that x(0) = 0 with an attack u(t), the output can be written as: y = −Ce
At λx 0 . As any vector in λ x T 0 u T 0 T , λ ∈ R can be chosen to settle the attack, it leads to an impossible detection for a small enough λ.
Theorem 2: If system (1) with A Hurwitz has at least one invariant zero with zero real part, ∀ ε > 0, the system is permanently boundly attackable with a ε-stealthy attack [7] .
Moreover, with x 0 the state-zero direction, λ = ε/(2||Cx 0 ||γ) and δ = ln( ε+2||Cλx 0 γ|| ε ) ζ where γ and ζ such that ∀ vector v, ||e
At v|| γe −ζt ||v||, we define u(t) = l i=0 u t k (t) consisting in a finite sum of attacks of the form u ti (t) = 0 t < t i λu 0 Re(e s0(t−ti) ) t t i , with t i = iδ, u(t)
is called a stair attack.
• Proof: For simplicity, we take x(0) = 0. First if the system has an invariant zero s 0 with zero real part, ∃ (x 0 , u 0 ) with
a given ε is defined as follows : λ = ε/(2||Cx 0 ||γ). Since A is a Hurwitz, ∃ (γ, ζ) ∈ R 2 * + such that ||e At x 0 || γe −ζt ||x 0 ||. For a given ε, we define δ = ln(
We consider the attack u(t) = l i=0 u t k (t) consisting in a finite sum of attacks of the form u ti (t) = 0 t < t i λu 0 Re(e s0(t−ti) ) t t i , with t i = iδ. If s 0 = 0, 1 − e −kζδ ) ε/2 + ε/2 ε Then, the attack u(t) is ε-stealthy and bounded. For t > lδ, x u (t) = le s0t λx 0 , so for a given α, it exists a real T 1 such that ∀t > T 1 , ||x|| 2,[t,t+T ] α with well chosen l i.e well-chosen number of steps.
2) Crenel (periodic discontinuous function) Attacks: As in the previous subsection, in the following, the condition for a malicious stealthy attack represented by a crenel signal (periodic discontinuous function) will be given in order to remain undetectable. First, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: For system (1), the matrix A has a null eigenvalue associated to the eigenvector v 0 ; the other eigenvalues have a negative real part such that Cv 0 = 0, and Im( B AB . . . A n−1 B ), the reachable set from the origin, is not orthogonal to v 0 ; so ∀ t 1 , ∃ u t1 defined between t 0 and t 1 such that x(t 1 ).v 0 = 0.
• From this assumption, A has a 0 invariant zero, v 0 is the state-zero direction and u 0 = 0 is the input-zero direction. Stealthy attacks are possible and low actions can remain stealthy despite all slowly increasing value of x(t 1 ).
Theorem 3: Assuming assumption 1, ∀ ε > 0, system (1) is permanently boundly attackable with a ε-stealthy attack.
• Proof: It is easy to prove that ∀ ε ∈ R + , ∃ λ ∈ R + and ∆ > t 1 , such that ∀ t end > 0 u(t) = λu t1 for t ∈ [k∆, k∆+t 1 [ and t < t end 0 for t ∈ [k∆+t 1 , (k+1)∆[ or t t end (10) u is an ε-stealthy attack. For a given (α, T ) ∈ R + 2 , with a high enough t end , we have ∀t > t end , ||x|| 2,[t,t+T ] α.
C. Attack on robust system
In the following subsection, two main points are studied. Conditions for a "fake disturbance attack" to remain undetectable will be first given, and then we will see how the intrusion/attack risk may be evaluated in this considered case. 1) Undetectable "fake disturbance" attack: From the previous statements (lemma 4 and theorem 2) and equation (8), a q×ν-matrix B V * and a q×n matrix F are defined. The following theorem gives the condition for a "fake disturbance attack" to remain undetectable.
Theorem 4: Consider system (3) attacked by a "fake disturbance attack" model (4). The non-zero attack a(t) = −y rh (t) + y f h (t) is not detectable if and only if the system (4) disturbance has the following form:
with v(t) ∈ R ν for all t and w f in W.
• Proof: System (3) attacked with model (4) consists to a non-zero attack Da(t) = a(t) = −y rh (t) + y f h (t) which is feasible from (5). Applying Theorem 1 to (6), u(t) is a nulling input if it has the following form:
Thanks to the notation of system (6) with the attack a(t), the "fake disturbance attack" of system (4) should has the following form:
with v(t) ∈ R ν for all t, such that w f in W is equivalent to for all t, Y rf (t) = C u y r (t) − C u y f (t) = 0 and w f ∈ W. As system (4) is considered with an x 0 r initial condition, this is equivalent to
with w f ∈ W and so from lemma 1, this is equivalent to the fact that the attack is undetectable.
• 2) Risk and security level evaluation: From the previous results, it appears that the security level depends on ν as well as the matrices B V * and F . In order to construct w f (t) from theorem 4, an estimation (or at least a partial estimation) of x r (t) and/or w r (t) may be required. For that, a decomposition in a basis depending on B V * is proposed.
As B V * is of full column rank of dimension q × ν, we can define a matrix Q = Q 1 Q 2 with Q 1 = B † V * and Q 2 of size (q − ν) × q such that KerQ 2 =ImB V * . Since Q is invertible, Qx = 0 ⇒ ∃ y such that x = B V * y ⇒ B † V * x = y. As B V * is of full column rank ⇒ y = 0 and x = 0. So in the new basis, equation (11) becomes:
it can also be written as: (20) where w f f ree is arbitrary.
To settle an attack, w rf ixed (t) = Q 2 w r (t) and Q 2 F x r need to be known (estimated or measured). Regarding the difficulties to obtain these data, with estimation for instance, the intrusion/attack risk may be evaluated.
The following theorem is given in order to make an attack undetectable. Theorem 5: An attack a(t) defined by a(t) = −y rh (t) + y f h (t) is undetectable, if ν = q, ∀ w f ∈ W.
• Proof: If ν = q, B V * is square and invertible, with w f (t) ∈ W given by (11) and
In this particular case, hacker does not have to know w r , he can use an arbitrary w f as fake disturbance and remains undetectable. On the other extreme, if there is no freedom for the choice of w f , ν = 0, with the ideal case x 0 f = x 0 r yields to w f = w r so there is no attack. For 0 < ν < q, attack is possible but we need to estimate at least partially w r and F * x r .
The reachable set for attackers is within R * the maximal outputnulling controllability subspace, is exactly R
D. invariant zero danger
Different cases can be analyzed with respect to the sign of the real part of s 0 :
1) Re(s 0 ) > 0: The attacker can hardly ensure w f ∈ W as we must have u(t) = λu 0 Re(e s0t ) and as exponential disturbance should not exist. So invariant zero of system (6) with positive real part will prevent the attacker to perform an undetectable attack unless it has a zero-input direction u 0 = 0 i.e. system (6) has an unobservable and unstable mode as it is described in [11] .
2) Re(s 0 ) < 0: attack effect disappears with time, and their initial effect cannot be controlled as ||λ|| must remain small to have undetected attack. (see section III-B.1 and def.9).
3) Re(s 0 ) = 0: With a fake disturbance attack, u(t) would be an considered as an input attack for system (6) . So the step attack (see Th.2) can be effective as explained previously. A step bounded permanent difference of disturbances u(t) would yield to a ε-stealthy attack with some well-chosen δ and λ and A u Hurwitz. Another danger would be the constant attack when A u has a zero eigenvalue, as described in section III-B.2.
IV. SIMPLE AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The considered system is of a one-dimensional moving cart whose horizontal position needs to be controlled. A speed proportional friction term and an unknown force F due the wind are taken into account. The system obeys the Newton's second law and is modeled in continuous time as
where x represents the position of the cart and unitary mass is chosen for simplicity. The corresponding state space model for this system is:
where v represents the velocity of the cart. A linear quadratic regulator is used with the gain K = 1 1.7311 T . To simplify, during the attack we consider that the real disturbance is null. In the following, different conditions for attack due to different measurement outputs are illustrated for this example.
In this case, the controller has only access to the position. A H ∞ functional observer minimizing disturbance effect on estimation can be used see [6] : T . So an observer based control is acting. The hacking is made on the only available measurement, the position, the simulation is as follows: the attack starts at 20sec i.e. at that time real sensor data is replaced by the sensor data of the model with the fake disturbance. In Fig.2 , the real and the fake wind force are plotted, in Fig.3 there are the real position, the falsely modeled position and the observed position. Fig.3 shows the divergence of the real position, so the attack is efficient. With a full takeover of the measurements, this case corresponds to theorem 5 (the computation can be made with C u = [0 0] to avoid empty matrix manipulation), so the attack is undetectable. Indeed, in Fig.3 , the real disturbance at t = 25s and the fake one at t = 25s have the same consequences on the observed data. With the same attack as before, the first component of the residue is plotted in Fig.4 . After the dynamic establishment of the observer, the attack is well-detected, there is even a permanent deviation on the first residue.
2) C h = [1 0]: In this case ν = 0, but the corresponding system (6) satisfy assumption 1, i.e. matrix ).
From theorem 3, stealthy attacks are possible as it is shown Fig.5 . In Fig.7 , the residues due to the attacks are plotted. Even with a very low threshold the residue can remain under it. As it can be seen on the first curve of Fig.6 , despises the stealthiness of the attack, it is a potentially damageable one as we see a constant slope on x r .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a particular type of cyber attack by data injection on imperfectly known network control system has been analyzed. The danger of the so-called fake disturbance attack is enhanced and design conditions to avoid undetectable attack are given. A simple example illustrates different conditions for attacks due to different measurement outputs. Perspective in this research field remains numerous. As future work, the possible effects of these attack with respect to different type of disturbance (uncertainties, unknown inputs, noise, nonlinearities) will be deeply analyzed.
